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INTRODUCTION

Utility regulation in the United States reflects the influence of a
wide range of social, political, and financial concerns and conditions. During the past decade the cost of new plant and resources
has increased, resulting in a financially weakened utility industry.'
t Distinguished Professor of Administrative Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
Professor Hamilton received his B.A. degree from Colorado College in 1967, his J.D. degree from the University of Minnesota in 1970, and his M.A. degree from the University of
Michigan in 1979.
t Member, Minnesota Bar. Mr. Colacci received his B.A. degree from Augsburg
College in 1974 and his J.D. degree from William Mitchell College of Law in 1982. He is
currently Law Clerk to the Honorable Lawrence R. Yetka of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. At the conclusion of his judicial clerkship, Mr. Colacci will become an associate in
the Minneapolis law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.
1. Ser Cicchetti & Shaughnessy, Our Nation's Gas and Electric Utilities: Time to Decide,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 3, 1981, at 29; Hitch, Utilitiesin Trouble, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 4,
1982, at 18; Smartt, Utilities in the Year 1982, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 21, 1982, at 6; Studness, Genesis of the Current FinancialPlight of Electric Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19,
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This was accompanied by a rise in consumer interest and participation in the regulatory process, further increasing costs. The regulatory process must be improved to more effectively address
recent trends and developments in the industry.
Before implementing any meaningful changes, the overall objectives of utility regulation must be examined. Objectives must be
clearly and operationally defined before the regulatory process will
utilize them effectively and consistently. A laundry list of potentially conflicting and impracticable objectives serves little purpose.
It is essential to indicate priorities among these objectives to guide
the actions of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and ensure accountability. 2 Several objectives seem appropriate for consideration by the commission: (1) economic efficiency, including
allocative efficiency, production efficiency, and a limitation on
profits (the satisfaction of the revenue requirement); (2) fairness in
pricing, broadly defined as equal treatment of equals; and
(3) accountability.
Both practical problems of implementation and conflicts among
objectives are present. For example, the use of pure marginal cost
pricing will only fortuitously approximate the revenue requirement. 3 There is also controversy concerning whether there exists
any practicable method of determining marginal costs. 4 These is1980, at 54; Studness, Potentialof a 1980 Electric Utility FinancialCrisis, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
April 10, 1980, at 35; Swanson & Swanson, The CriticalProblem of Inflation in Utih'y Rate
Making, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 7, 1982, at 29; Big Fnancial froblems Hit Electric Utilities;
Bankruptcies Feared, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1981, at 1,col. 5.
2. The concept of accountability has been addressed by several scholars. For accountability to be a practical tool in regulation, firms must be required to report on their
actions and explain or justify actions taken. See W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY
AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 190 (1960). Also, the concept must include the power "to prescribe the standards of expectation" against which to compare the firm, R. JAILE, MANAGEMENT OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN INDIA 912 (1967), and the power to penalize
inadequate performance and reward excellence. Id. at 93; R. POZEN, LEGAL CHOICES
FOR STATE ENTERPRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD 28 (1976). Application of the accountability concept is meaningless if objectives are not clearly articulated or consist of merely a
listing of several concerns without indicating the order in which policies are to be pursued.
See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 25 (1981); see
also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J., concurring), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976); R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 18-19
(1979). Seegeneral4' 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 207-08 (2d ed. 1978). It
thus becomes important to adhere to one primary objective in order to improve
accountability.
3. See 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 88-89 (1970).

4. See, e.g., ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF ENERGY ON
PRINCIPLES OF ELECTRICITY COSTING AND PRICING FOR ONTARIO HYDRO 50 (1979).
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sues are discussed later.
This article will define and indicate priorities among the three
above-mentioned objectives: economic efficiency, fairness in pricing, and accountabilityi It then discusses: (1) why economic effi6
ciency should be the primary objective of utility regulation;
(2) how the concept is more fully defined;7 and (3) why obstacles in
applying marginal cost pricing do not compel abandonment of
economic concepts"
II.

DEFINITIONS AND PRIORITIES

The primary objective of utility regulation should be economic
efficiency. This overall objective embodies two principal conditions-allocative efficiency and production efficiency. Allocative
efficiency is implemented through the use of marginal cost pricing.
Basing prices on the incremental cost of service to various classes of
users facilitates rational consumer responses and decisions by giving consumers accurate price signals. This provides an inherent
pressure on the industry to respond to demand in an allocatively
efficient manner. 9
The production efficiency concept seeks lowest cost production,
minimal waste, conservation, and movement towards the most justifiable use of available resources. This type of efficiency is accomplished by scrutinizing managements' decision-making process.
Production efficiency is concededly more practicably applicable
than is allocative efficiency. Although both allocative efficiency
and production efficiency should be pursued together as part of
overall economic efficiency, either can be pursued
5. See infra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
6. See infia notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
7.

See infta notes 47-57 and accompanying text.

8. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
9. See A. KAHN, supra note 3. Professor Kahn, while recognizing that marginal cost

pricing is only the starting point and is based on certain unprovable assumptions, succinctly states the theoretical basis for concluding that such pricing leads to the optimum
allocation of resources:
Since under pure competition incremental revenues to the businessman are simply the market price times the additional quantities sold, we have the elementary
proposition that under pure competition businessmen will increase production
and sales up to the point where their marginal costs are equated to price. Therefore, competitive behavior assures the equation of price and marginal cost that is
required if free consumer choices are to result in the optimum allocation of
resources.

Id. at 67.
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independently.'o
Limitation of supra-normal profits or satisfaction of the revenue
requirement is a third condition, not normally associated with the
basic analysis of economic efficiency, but actually following from
it. This conclusion follows from the assumption that regulated
utilities are natural monopolies. If capacity is to be maintained in
a natural monopoly, a natural monopoly should, on the average,
earn zero economic profit. As Schmalensee points out:
[E]conomic efficiency is generally enhanced by marginal cost
pricing. Under natural monopoly, marginal cost pricing need
not imply zero economic profit for the enterprise as a whole.
Indeed in the classic natural monopoly case of everywhere declining average cost and a single product, marginal cost pricing
implies price below average cost and thus negative economic
profit. "
This situation presents two problems. If capacity is not to be
contracted in the long run, this deficit must be covered by requiring the customers of the enterprise to meet total costs.' 2 A privately owned and unregulated natural monopolist, however, seeks
not only to cover average total costs, but also to secure a monopoly
10. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2. Professor Schmalensee states:
A critical prerequisite for overall economic efficiency is efficient production, minimization of the total cost of providing goods or services. As Comanor (1970)
and Schmalensee (1974) note in the natural monopoly context, a little production
tntejiency can do more harm than a lot of irrational pricing. In the short run, output
must be produced at minimum cost from existing facilities. In the long run,
investment must be made at appropriate times and in appropriate amounts, and
new technology should be developed and adopted at the optimal rate. The costs
associated with social control processes should be as low as possible.
Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added); see also A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 26-35; ONTARIO ENERGY
BOARD, supra note 4. The Ontario Energy Board states:
While efficiency in the technical or engineering sense has always been an operational objective for Ontario Hydro, it is closely linked to pricing because movement towards engineering efficiency leads to the lowest possible unit cost of
power and rate levels. . . . [T]his objective would lead to the lowest cost allocation of resources used in producing electricity.
It is therefore a practical and appropriate objective for electricity pricing
and would not interfere with the application of the fairness objective in the ratesetting process.
Id. at 28.
11. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 37.
12. The deficit could be covered by general taxation, but this, of course, imposes distortions elsewhere in the economy and, given the benefit theory of taxation, poses the
serious equity issue of why taxpayers should subsidize those who consume a natural monopoly output. Requiring customers to cover total costs guards against excessive investment. See id. at 37-38; A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 130-31 & n.15.
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profit. This implies its own avoidable efficiency losses.' 3 Profit
limitation (the satisfaction of the revenue requirement) is, therefore, a valid goal of efficiency-oriented natural monopoly control. 14
A secondary objective for the commission is fairness in pricing,
referred to as the equal treatment of equals.' 5 This is an abstract
and difficult to define objective.' 6 The principal meaning seems to
be the equal treatment of equals based on cost causally. 17 Fairness
entails recovery of "tracking" costs, to the extent possible, from
those who cause them. Fairness also implies stable rates that permit customers to predict what rates might be in the long term and
to make appropriate decisions about their investments.' 8
Tracking costs, avoiding undue discrimination among equally
situated consumers, and ensuring predictable rates is consistent
with economic efficiency. Pricing through cost tracking can be implemented using historical accounting costs, replacement costs or
short or long run marginal costs.' 9 Moreover, a commission utilizing the principal objective of economic efficiency is more predictable than a commission balancing competing objectives, thus,
20
greater stability will be apparent.
The following discussion indicates that one of the critical conditions for economic efficiency, marginal cost pricing, may not yet be
practicable. Until marginal cost pricing is practicable, the next
best alternative called for by fairness in pricing is cost tracking
2
based on historical accounting costs or replacement costs. '

If

marginal cost pricing is not implemented, the sub-objective of pro13. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 37-38.
14. The Ontario Energy Board concludes that a revenue requirement based on ac-

counting costs is in conflict with and prevents implementation of the theory of marginalcost pricing. Ste ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at 24, 27. The view that anything other than first-best marginal cost pricing is the only alternative consistent with
economic efficiency is erroneous. Economic efficiency implies the optimal use of available
resources to maximize welfare. In an everywhere decreasing cost industry, second-best
involving higher prices to inelastic demand consumers will permit a fuller achievement of
economies of scale and will maximize welfare. This is consistent with economic efficiency.
See A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 131-33 & n.17; R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 38-39.
15. See, e.g., ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at 12, 24.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id. at 125.
18. Id. at 24, 44.
19. Id. at 34.
20. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 20.
21. Time-differentiated rates are not linked solely to marginal cost pricing. Fairness
and cost tracking can be enhanced by time-differentiated rates "provided that there are
significant cost variations over time and the rating periods match those patterns of cost
variation to the extent practical." ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at 35.
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duction efficiency or lowest cost production is independently meri22
torious. This sub-objective can be measured and is achievable.
When economic efficiency is the primary objective and fairness
(cost tracking) is a secondary objective, regulation should avoid
income redistribution through cross subsidies. Income redistribution is generally inconsistent with determinations based on economic efficiency and fairness, except where economic efficiency
creates a choice among equal alternatives. 23 Income redistribution
is a legislative concern. It should not be promoted or advocated
within the regulatory framework. Once rates and regulations are
based on sound economic principles, legislative bodies may alleviate any hardships society as a whole deems inequitable. It should
not be the role of utility commissions to make broad social welfare
24
determinations based on personal, and therefore political, values.
Accountability is a principal secondary objective necessary to
achieve economic efficiency. 25 Commissions must allow consum22. Id. at 28.
23. See Posner, Taxation by Regulatton, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. 22 (1971); see also A. KAHN,
supra note 3, at 191; R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 19-20. The Ontario Energy Board
stated:
Rate-making aimed at income redistribution was rejected by all the participants,
and we agree that such an approach would be contrary to the principles of fairness and would distort cost tracking. If electricity rates based on cost should
prove burdensome to low-income customers, redress of any imbalance is the responsibility not of Ontario Hydro but of government. In our opinion, departure
from cost-based rates would be unjustified and could lead to major inequities.
ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at 28-29.

24. It must be stressed that the regulatory framework may, in some circumstances, be
the most efficient means by which to implement socially desirable cross subsidies. Once
the social policy issues have been addressed and resolved by the proper legislative forum,
utility commissions may be the appropriate implementing vehicle. Professor Posner offers
some suggestions on how to avoid the worst features of hidden cross subsidization as it
currently exists throughout regulated industries. First, the hidden nature of the subsidies
should be eliminated by identification of the amount, cost, recipients, and payors of each
subsidy. "Second, more consideration should be given to the most efficient method of
attaining the ends of internal subsidization." Posner, supra note 23, at 47.
25. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 120-29. The authors, in discussing the current problems of the transit industry, state:
The second problem with policy formation at all levels of government is evidenced by the fact that the case studies did not reveal a single transit system with
a mechanism to guarantee movement toward more efficient production, nor
were there any truly effective standards of excellence against which management
could be measured. This is of extreme concern. Without these conditions, observations on "efficiency" are meaningless. It is irrelevant that management appears efficient, or that management vows it is producing at lowest cost. No one is
sure that another manager could not do the job better (that is, more efficiently).
Without assurance of relatively efficient production, excessive costs are difficult
to detect.
Id. at 11; see also Samprone & Riddel-Dudra, State Regulatoty Climate. Can It Be Predicted?,
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ers, utility companies, courts, the media, and scholars to monitor
and evaluate decisions. As Schmalensee points out, "The ability to
review performance makes control possible. If individual agencies
are charged with the pursuit of well-defined objectives, their performance can be reviewed. It is the notion that regulators should
pursue and strike an appropriate balance among a variety of ill26
defined goals that makes effective control difficult."

Utility commissions must stop avoiding accountability by playing legislator in balancing numerous objectives. Control of utilities is an area in which the single clear objective of economic
efficiency can be adopted and accountability can be achieved.
Leibenstein points out that social goals usually degenerate into
vague assertions about how society is to be served, and are used to
rationalize inept performance. Setting social goals as a regulatory
objective substantially decreases accountability because it is difficult to separate and assign the costs for these functions. Yet, the
self interest of a commission is served by failing to account sepa27
rately for these functions.
III.

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AS THE PRIMARY GOAL OF
UTILITY REGULATION

Two significant considerations compel treating economic efficiency as the primary objective of utility regulation. First, and
perhaps most important, is the nature of the industry being regulated. Classic public utility industries, such as water and sewer
services and the local distribution of gas and electricity, are perceived as natural monopolies. 28 The nature of a natural monopoly
justifies its regulation. Regulation is required because the economic performance of natural monopolies tends to be unsatisfactory without special controls.
The second consideration that compels treating economic efficiency as the primary objective of utility regulation is the inadequacy and inappropriateness of alternative objectives. Regulation
based primarily on political or social objectives is inadequate because such models cannot be implemented effectively by regulaPUB.UTIL. FORT., Oct. 8, 1981, at 41 (discussing predictability of regulatory climate as to
elected versus appointed commissions, business training, and experience).
26. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 18-19.

27. H. LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 174, 178 (1978).
28. R.

SCHMALENSEE,

supra note 2, at 4.
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tory agencies. Utility commissions are not the proper forums to
present and decide broad social issues. This task is more appropriately left to state and federal legislatures. The political model is
inadequate because it, of necessity, ignores the overall public interest and responds only to interest groups who participate in the
time-consuming regulatory process and who can meaningfully
pierce the complex rulemaking and adjudicatory system. Part A
below discusses the natural monopoly problem. Part B analyzes
the inadequacies of alternative objectives.
A.

Natural Monopoly

An industry is said to be a natural monopoly if production is
most efficiently done by a single firm or other entity. 29 For example, the local distribution of gas and electricity involves networks
along which energy is transmitted from a relatively small number
of locations to a relatively large number of geographically dispersed consumers. If there are everywhere decreasing average
costs of transmission within the network, such a distribution sys30
tem is a natural monopoly.
An industry that experiences decreasing average costs is a natural monopoly. The most efficient market structure is a single firm.
In such an industry, only one firm will survive, either as a result of
competition between firms or due to a grant of monopoly status by
a governmental entity. With this monopoly status comes some
control over price. Any firm that is the sole producer of a product
enjoys some degree of control over price. The extent of this control
depends on the existence of other products or services that serve as
substitutes for the products or services offered by the monopolist.
If other products are close substitutes, the monopolist's control
over price will not be great.
If, however, the monopolist produces goods or services for which
there are no close substitutes, the demand for the good or service is
likely to be insensitive to the price charged by the monopolist. In
29. Id. at 3; see also Hamilton & Hamilton, Duopoly in the Distribution of Electricity. A
Policy Failure, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. - (1983) (manuscript accepted for publication); A.
KAHN, supra note 3, at 121. But see Primeaux, Some Problems with Natural Monopoly, 24
ANTITRUST BULL. 63, 63-64 (1979) (considerable ambiguity associated with definition of
natural monopoly).
30. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 4; Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 29.
The presumption derived from such a situation is that costs of providing the service will be
lower if a single supplier provides the service in the given market. See A. KAHN, supra note
3, at 11.
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such cases, the monopolist is likely to charge prices substantially in
excess of cost and suffer no loss of demand. Such prices can have
sizable adverse effects on the efficiency with which scarce resources
are employed. 3 1 Regulatory control provides potential benefits by
forcing prices down to the level of costs. The gain from such benefits depends on the costs faced by the industry, the success of the
regulatory process in minimizing those costs, and the demand conditions in the industry. Benefits of regulation increase to the degree that demand is unresponsive to price.
If we apply the above analysis to gas and electricity distribution,
it becomes clear why a special control strategy is necessary and
beneficial. Few substitutes exist for electricity and gas. Substitutes
which do exist are generally more expensive to the consumer than
the products offered by the public utility industries. Clearly, the
benefits achieved through regulation result from the essentially
captive nature of demand and depend upon the ability of utility
commissions to keep prices and costs down. Since these benefits
derive from an economic basis, and have no direct political or social implications, the primary goal of utility commissions should
be to compel economic efficiency in these natural monopoly
32
industries.
B. Non-Economic Models
The conclusion that utility regulation should focus on economic
efficiency is further compelled by the inadequacy of alternative
regulatory goals in achieving beneficial, equitable, and economically sound results. Three alternative models are often advanced
as superior or preferable to economic based regulation. For convenience, they are labeled the political, social/consumerist, and
free-market models. None of these approaches to utility regulation
is adequate or preferable to the economic efficiency model.
A

The PoliticalModel

The political model of utility regulation is based on achieving
perfect political competition between interest groups.

33

This view

31. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 5.
32. See Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 29; R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 4, 1819; Daniel, The New Theoy of Fucb Utilities: The Case of the Natural Monopoly, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 133, 139 (1981); Fanara, Suelflow & Draba, Energy and Competition. The Saga
of Electric Power, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 125, 126 (1980).
33. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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argues that utility regulation is only one important example of
government regulation of private activity. The problems of utility
regulation are similar to those of health, safety or education. The
economic considerations are secondary and are given only passing
attention. Regulation fails under this model when the commission
fails to act in the same manner as elected officials would have if
34
put in the same position.

There are several deficiencies in this concept. It does not serve
as an effective approach to regulation nor does it provide adequate
guidance to utility commissions. The political model sacrifices the
overall public interest by responding only to special interest groups
that participate in the regulatory process. The adjudicatory posture of rate cases coming before the commission results in an exceedingly complex process. Parties must present detailed and
thorough evidence to support their positions. Meaningful participation by groups not commanding substantial resources and expertise is essentially precluded.3 5 While public hearings are
provided, and any interested group may intervene as a party in the
rate case, the practical influence of such input is minimal. As a
result, the commission only considers the interests of a few select
interest groups. The utility company, state agencies, and a very
limited number of citizen groups are the dominant parties. Of necessity, a narrow cross section of interests is represented. The commission is therefore unable to respond to the vast number of
potentially conflicting social goals and interests that exist but are
36
not adequately represented in rate cases.
Proponents of the political model prescribe political action and
tighter control of the commission by the elected chief executive as
general remedies for the ineffectiveness of regulation. 37 This prescription has little chance of curing the inherent problems of the
political model. Tighter executive control does nothing to narrow
the range of social choices available to the commission. Objectives
34. Id.
35. The experience of Evan Henry illustrates this problem. See Hagen, Man Finds it's
Hardto Make Mark in Rate Case, Minneapolis Trib., Mar. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Henry is
a semi-retired certified public accountant who intervened in a Northwestern Bell rate case
before the Minnesota commission. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket No. P-421/GR80-911 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 29, 1981). His experience was one of frustration and financial
sacrifice. Not only was he unable to participate effectively in the case, but he was also
denied compensation for his costs.
36. See Layton, PatronageStill Runs Utihlties Commission, St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 30,
1980, at 1, col. 1.
37. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 12.
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are no more clearly articulated and the commission, therefore, is
no better able to respond effectively to crises. It is just not possible
for the commission to be responsive to the entire range of legiti38
mate social interests.
Direct election of regulators seems no more useful. Commentators suggest that direct elections result in less educated commissioners, less staff, and higher costs. 3 9 Voters have neither the time

nor the knowledge to make rational selections among candidates.
This conclusion does not assume that the electorate is ignorant or
indifferent, but recognizes the specialized nature of the task and
the need for commissions that possess a working knowledge of or
an expertise in economics, administration, management, and engineering. Voters simply do not have the requisite knowledge to
make informed choices.4°
Administrative law requirements that all affected interests be
heard are of little benefit. The very nature of the process results in
specialized interest groups exercising an inordinate influence in
comparison to other legitimate interests. The adjudicatory framework is costly, time consuming, and precludes meaningful participation by most groups and individuals. Additionally, it is best
suited to address bipolar issues. Many important issues in a rate
case, however, are not bipolar. Several commentators have suggested a more cooperative approach to utility regulation. 4' Such
an approach seems unlikely given the adversary nature of rate case
proceedings. In short, the political model of utility regulation
achieves few if any of the objectives sought by the model. Not only
are the goals and objectives vague and uncertain, but the nature of
38. A former commissioner has been quoted as saying, "And if you take a broader
social view of it in addition, you never are on top of it. It's a vastly complex, rapidly
changing area. [Utility companies] bring in six economists to intentionally shatter your
brain [at rate hearings]. It's very heavy stuff to try and comprehend." Layton, supra note
36, at 14A.
39. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, rupra note 2, at 120-22; see also Pelsoci, The
Energy Crisis and the New Breed of Regulators: A Study of State P'ublic Utility Commissions (manuscript accepted for publication in Midwest Review of Public Administration); Pelsoci,
Commission Attnbutes and Regulatory Discretion." A Longitudinal Study of State Public Utioly Commirsioners (1978) (unpublished manuscript).
40. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 121; see also Heggs, Merit
Selection of the OhioJudiciaq: An Analysis of SJ. 6, anda ProposalforImplementation, 28 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 628 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Abell, Rate ofReturn Sorall and Institutional Bi4s, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct.
8, 1981, at 31; Willis, The Needfor Common Seome in Gas Energ Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Oct. 22, 1981, at 15.
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the process precludes the achievement of these goals. 42
2. Soczal/Consumerisl Model
A second model, often advocated by consumer oriented interests, is based on furthering a narrow range of social concerns, particularly those of lower income consumers. The goal is to keep
43
utility rates as low as possible for the benefit of low income users.
No one can deny the hardship to consumers of increasing energy
rates. Utility commissions, however, are not the appropriate forum to address income redistribution issues. Commissions should
not act ad hoc as legislatures, imposing personal values on the industries subject to regulation. Lifeline rate issues and other income redistribution schemes are a legislative concern better
addressed through taxation. Such issues are ill-suited for consideration by state utility commissions.
While this article does not analyze lifeline rates and other income redistribution programs in depth, a brief mention must be
made of the failure of lifeline rates to achieve its own goals and
objectives. This failure illustrates the inadequacy of any utility
commission in dealing with issues better left to the legislature.
The basic premise of lifeline rates is that such rates aid needy
consumers in coping with rising energy bills and promote energy
conservation. It is assumed that low income consumers use less
energy than more affluent consumers and that by allowing lower
rates for initial blocks of consumption such consumers will use less
energy. Low income consumers are likely to have fewer large appliances and are encouraged to keep usage down, with a view to42. See Hitch, supra note 1, at 18. Mr. Hitch states:
And what is peculiar to both [the U.S. and electricity] is our system of rate regulation, with its rules and traditions (including the use of historical capital costs as
the rate base), its time-consuming and legalistic due processes, and its built-in
political pressures. The system worked well enough as long as inflation was low
and slow and the costs of producing electricity were constant or falling. It has
not worked well in an era of double digit inflation and even more rapidly escalating costs of electricity generation. Replacement costs are now two to four
times or more the historical capital costs used in rate determinations. The delays
inherent in the system are no longer tolerable when costs are escalating rapidly.
And the sheer magnitude of the cost increases has made it difficult, both procedurally and especially politically, for regulators to cope.
Id. at 19.
43. Lifeline rates have been the primary vehicle for furthering this objective. A related program deals with the winter shutoff issue. Minnesota has instituted a "cold
weather rule" to deal with the problem of low income users being unable to keep up with
their energy bills. For a brief discussion of a similar program in Missouri, see Smartt,
Shutoffs in Winter- Balancing Conicting Needs, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 7, 1982, at 4.
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wards lowering monthly energy bills. Opponents of lifeline rates
challenge these basic assumptions. The correlation between income and energy use is far from conclusive. If the premise is erroneous, a major support for the rates is absent. In addition, if
demand is relatively inelastic, low income users may actually be
injured as a result of lower front end block rates, since succeeding
blocks are priced higher. Finally, such rates may not promote conservation because consumers receive distorted price signals. Lower
prices at the initial levels of use may encourage increased con44
sumption rather than conservation.
No definitive conclusions are drawn here regarding the success
or failure of lifeline rates to achieve their stated objectives. After
years of discussion, study, and experimentation, the wisdom and
advisability of using a system of lifeline rates to aid a segment of
the population and promote energy conservation are far from established. These inconclusive results are a persuasive reason to discourage utility commissions from experimenting with ad hoc
income redistribution plans. The better reasoned approach is to
put the social policy decisions in the hands of the legislature,
where it rightly belongs. Aid to low income consumers is essentially an issue of taxation. If the decision is made to impose a tax
on the majority of society to aid those less fortunate, then it should
be made by elected officials who are accountable to the electorate.
This decision should not rest with utility commissioners who have
no effective way of evaluating the totality of social concerns because they are unable to address social policy questions in a sufficiently comprehensive manner.
The pursuit of vague and conflicting social objectives also
reduces the effectiveness of judicial review. The proper role of a
court is not to make social policy choices, but to compel accountability for the decisions that are made. If policies and objectives are
ill-defined at the administrative level, judicial review cannot effec44. A significant body of literature addresses the success and failure of lifeline rates.
The results of the studies are ambiguous at best and compel the conclusion that commissioners are ill-equipped to engage in the purposeful manipulation of rates to cure inequities in income distribution. See Canan & Hennesy, In Defense of Lifeline Rates. An Empirical
Analyst', PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 5, 1981, at 31; Dobesh & Kaufmann, Service Area and
JurisdictionalVariations in FactorsIn.lencing Residential Electricity Demand, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Aug. 5, 1982, at 33; Koger, Is There EconomicJustfifationfor a So-Called Lifeline Rate?, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., May 10, 1979, at 11; Roll & Lande, Lifeline Rates: Impact and Sitgnifrance,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 31, 1980, at 13; Symons, California Rate Experiments: Lifeline or
Leadweight?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 26, 1978, at 11; Lifeline Rates: An Update, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Aug. 13, 1981, at 48; The Lifeline Rate Issue, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 11, 1978, at 42.
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tively exercise its overseeing function. If, however, commission
policy is clearly articulated and based on economic principles and
objectives, the court is better able to monitor performance and
45
compel accountability.
3.

Free Market Model

The final model promotes competition to the fullest extent possible. This model may gain favor in the immediate future due to
regulation and administrathe present national mood favoring less
46
tive interference in the marketplace.
The promotion of competition where feasible is a valid goal. Introducing competition into any industry, such as the generation of
electricity or the telecommunication area, deserves serious study.
One basic fact, however, must be kept in mind. The phenomenon
of natural monopoly is the basis for utility regulation. As long as
the economic performance of an industry without regulatory controls results in the power of one firm to control price and create
monopoly profits, that industry must be governed by more than
competitive market pressures. The problems remaining are those
of identifying natural monopoly markets in the utility industry,
and of effectively regulating them, not whether the industry
should be regulated at all.
4.

Summaty

Examination of alternative utility regulation models indicates
that economic efficiency should be the main guide for policies and
objectives to control natural monopoly power. Such an approach
avoids most of the shortfalls and deficiencies of other potential
models. It allows consumers to rationally choose consumption
levels. It also allows the social policy and income redistribution
decisions to be made by legislatures. Finally, the economic efficiency model allows meaningful monitoring of the regulatory process and holds commissions and participants accountable to the
courts for their decisions.
45. See K. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 207-08.
46. See Blair, The Scope of Regulation in the Competitive Telephone Equipment Market, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Dec. 17, 1981, at 29; Smartt, Power Generation: A Candidatefor Deregulation?,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 31, 1980, at 4; Trebing, Structural Change and Regulatory Reform in the
Utitities Industries, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 388, 392 (1980); Calif. PUC President Argues Case for
Deregulation ofElectric Utilities, ELEC. WEEK, June 8, 1981, at 7. But see White, A Closer Look
at Electric Utility Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 21, 1982, at 19.
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APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY MODEL

Once economic efficiency is determined to be the prime objective of utility regulation, the task becomes one of application. The
concept of economic efficiency must be broken down into two
parts for purposes of implementation. Both allocative efficiency
and production efficiency should be pursued simultaneously as primary objectives. Allocative efficiency is based on micro-economic
theory and dictates the use of marginal cost pricing to achieve the
efficient use and allocation of resources. It provides accurate price
signals to consumers and allows rational choices between alternative uses of resources. 47 Production efficiency also seeks the efficient allocation of scarce resources but is more concrete in
application. The goal is lowest cost production. This implies a
minimum of waste, the promotion of economically efficient and
justified uses of resources through load management techniques,
48
and close monitoring of management decisions.
Allocative efficiency focuses on the area of rate design. Rate
design has long been neglected by courts and is given less attention
from utility commissions than it requires. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has made it clear that it will not analyze commission rate design decisions in detail.49 By labeling the issue as legislative, the court has deferred the policymaking function to the
commission.
Perhaps the greatest impetus for careful consideration of rate
design issues was the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).5° PURPA mandates that state
commissions consider rate design issues and write conclusions and
determinations as to why specified guidelines are rejected or
adopted. 51 PURPA caused a wealth of study and examination of
rate design issues. The PURPA guidelines spawned debate and
consideration of important rate design issues in general and margi47. See R. SCHMALENSEE, .rupra note 2, at 29; A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 65.
48. See ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at 28; R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note
2, at 33-37. "As Comanor (1970) and Schmalensee (1974) note in the natural monopoly
context, a little production inefficiency can do more harm than a lot of irrational pricing."
Id. at 33-34.
49. See Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, 302 N.W.2d 5
(Minn. 1980); St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, 251
N.W.2d 350 (Minn. 1977).
50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (Supp. V 1981).
51. Id. §§ 2621-2627. See generallv Joskow, Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978- Electn'
Utilit Rate Reform, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 788 (1979).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

nal cost pricing theory in particular. 52 This development is important because it has provided an opportunity to evaluate the
desirability and feasability of marginal cost pricing methodologies.
In a time of rising energy costs and growing scarcities of resources,
efficient and well considered rate design policies are crucial to the
achievement of conservation, continued adequate supplies, and efficient regulation. It is still unclear whether commissions have the
ability to apply marginal cost pricing theory to rate cases.
Whether they do or not, marginal cost theory should be a prime
policy objective in utility regulation. Further study and evaluation may be necessary before practical application can be
achieved. This is, however, not a reason to abandon the concept in
confavor of more easily applicable but theoretically bankrupt
53
cepts inherent in traditional regulatory approaches.
The following sections of this article discuss the basic theory of
marginal cost pricing, major criticisms of its use by regulatory
commissions, justifications for its application, and the validity of
production efficiency as a sub-objective.
A.

Marginal Cost Pricing

Marginal cost is the cost of producing one more unit, or alternatively, the cost that would be saved by producing one less unit.
The economist argues that consumers ought to pay a price equal
to the cost of providing that marginal unit. This conclusion is
based on the concept of choice. Since the cost of producing any
one unit is the cost of lost opportunity, that is, foregoing the pro52. See Radford, MarginalCost iricingConsideredin Recent Electric Rate Cases, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Oct. 9, 1980, at 49; One State Commission's View of a Voluntary PURPA Guideline, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., May 21, 1981, at 46.
53. See Crespi, Marginal Cost-of-Service Studies.- Some Practical Diffwulties, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Dec. 4, 1980, at 19. The author, after discussing the major practical difficulties
encountered by state commissions in implementing marginal cost pricing states:
Lest I appear unduly critical of marginal costing procedures let me comment
briefly on the use of rate making of embedded cost-of-service studies. It is better
to be approximately right than precisely wrong. Embedded cost studies simply
ignore the relevant future costs altogether. They therefore lack theoretical justification for providing even the limited assistance for efficiency-oriented rate
making that marginal costs provide, however imprecise the latter may be. Moreover, the seeming precision of embedded cost approaches vanishes when one attempts to allocate capital costs to different users in some rational manner; the
large number of equally inadequate formulas for this allocation has provided
grist for many unproductive hours of wrangling at rate hearings. I am convinced
that marginal costs, however difficult they may be to obtain, are the proper economic criteria for establishing efficiency-oriented rates.
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duction of an alternative product, the ultimate decision as to what
will be produced should lie with the consumer. 54 To make such
decisions correctly, the consumer must be guided by accurate price
signals. Consumers must be able to quantify the lost opportunity
cost of any choice. Only then will they be able to determine
whether the choice provides greater satisfaction than any alternative. "If their judgments are correctly informed in this way, they
will, by their individual purchase decisions, guide our scarce resources into those lines of production that yield more satisfaction
than all available alternatives-which
means that total satisfaction
'
55
will be maximized.

The extension of this reasoning to utility regulation dictates the
setting of utility rates at marginal cost. Numerous measurement
techniques have been proposed by marginal cost advocates. The
various techniques address and seek to remedy specific problems
which arise in applying marginal cost concepts to actual ratemaking. The remainder of this section discusses whether marginal cost
pricing can be meaningfully applied to ratemaking.
In theory, there is little argument that marginal cost pricing is
conceptually sound and appropriate. By reflecting the actual costs
and demand of energy use, marginal cost pricing allows consumers
to make rational choices as to individual use and quality of service
demanded. Accurate price signals are crucial to rational choices.
Beyond this basic justification, the concept provides a vehicle to
avoid cross subsidization. By exposing the extent to which rates
are not based on actual costs, the areas of cross subsidization are
identifiable and can thus be addressed openly and thoroughly,
rather than being merely implicit judgments of regulators, beyond
the reach of informed study, evaluation, and criticism. 56 If discrimination and income redistribution are identified and eliminated, the ratemaking process becomes more closely tied to
objective economic considerations. It is then possible to minimize
the value judgments of commissioners based on personal perceptions of equity and fairness. This provides an objective reviewable
standard. Without such a clear standard, many decisions cannot
be scrutinized by observers and participants and the accountability of the commission is diluted.
The principal criticism of marginal cost pricing focuses on prac54. See A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 29.
55. Id. at 29, 66; see also R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 29.
56. See Posner, supra note 23.
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tical problems of its application to ratemaking proceedings. For
example, in rejecting allocative efficiency as an appropriate pricing objective, the Ontario Energy Board stated:
We consider that economic efficiency cannot be achieved
through electricity rate structures. This objective reflects a theoretical exercise not valid in the context of a single electric utility. .

.

. While it may be theoretically desirable for society as a

whole, it is without practical significance for Ontario Hydro,
be even directionally
and there is no evidence that it would
57
appropriate as a pricing objective.
There are practical problems in applying allocative efficiency as
a pricing objective. These include the high cost of metering and
administration associated with generating adequate data, the
judgmental nature of allocating joint costs among various users,
the failure of current and available utility accounting data to reflect marginal costs, the imprecise nature of long-run marginal cost
pricing, and the selection of "true" marginal cost. 58 The Minne-

sota commission has articulated a concern with the practical
problems encountered when applying a marginal cost approach in
a ratemaking proceeding. The commission apparently recognizes
the desirability and appropriateness of marginal cost theories, but
has encountered problems in finding a practical and applicable
method. It has continued to compel cost studies to develop data as
59
a basis upon which to prescribe rates.
The principal response to criticisms of marginal cost principles is
that while the application of marginal cost pricing may only be
approximately right, the use of embedded costs is precisely
wrong. 60 Consumers should be given accurate information regarding the actual costs of present and future consumption. Information about historic embedded costs is irrelevant to consumers'
57. ONTARio ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at 27.
58. See Crespi, supra note 53, at 19; Journey, PURPA Rate Studies.- Much Ado About
Technical Analysis, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 16, 1981, at 23; Samuels, Problems of Marginal
Cost Pricing in Public Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 31, 1980, at 21; Trends and Topics,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 21, 1982, at 63-64; One State's Vew of a Voluntary PURPA Guideline,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 21, 1981, at 46.
59. See, e.g., Minnesota Gas Co., Docket No. G-008/GR-80-630 (Minn. P.U.C. Aug.
27, 1981); Northern States Power Co., 42 P.U.R.4th 339 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981).
60. See Crespi, supra note 53. Professor Kahn states:
[Als a matter of pure economics, adoption of any particular economic policy on
the basis of the rules we have expounded could well end up doing more harm
than good in practice. But the observation applies equally to the policy of having no policy.
A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 196.
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present planning. The use of embedded costs ignores future costs
entirely, lacks theoretical justification, and, no matter how precise
the figures, bears no relation to valid allocation of present and future costs.
The main problem with marginal cost pricing techniques lies
not in theory or justification, but rather in practical application.
This does not, however, justify dismissing it as an inappropriate
pricing objective. Continued study and experience will undoubtedly improve methods of measurement and bring down the cost of
gathering necessary data. Workable methodologies soon will be
available as to both application and reconciliation of the concept
with the revenue requirement. Continued effort and promotion of
marginal cost pricing methodologies will provide better pricing
6
techniques. '
The benefits of using allocative efficiency as a primary pricing
objective far outweigh any temporary obstacles to implementation
of marginal cost pricing. This is especially true since there is no
justification for adhering to traditional cost approaches. The commission should continue to compel detailed and extensive marginal cost studies. The information and evidence generated by such
studies should be applied whenever feasible.
A byproduct of these efforts is the inevitable increase in commission expertise and ability to evaluate and apply various methodologies, theories, and techniques. As the commission becomes more
comfortable with marginal cost studies, it should attempt to increase the general public's awareness and acceptance of the approach. If the objectives are clearly articulated and consistently
applied, the public will understand the basis and rationale behind
decisions and better respond through appeals to the legislature for
low-income programs, participation in rate cases or direct pressure
on the commission.
B.

Production Eftciency

Production efficiency is the second sub-objective of economic efficiency. Contrasted with allocative efficiency, production effi61. See Acton, An Evaluation of Economists' In.ience on Electric Utitty Rate Reforms, 72
AM. ECON. REv. 114 (1982) (marginal cost pricing techniques will improve); Carrigan,
The Great Electricity PricingDebate, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 19, 1982 at 17 (stressing importance of accurate price signals and necessity of implementing workable methods to achieve
them); Kamerschen & Stark, ,4Public Utlity Design Survey by States, Pue. UTIL FORT., July
22, 1982, at 46 (rising use of marginal cost pricing in recent years--8 states in 1980 and I I
states in 1982).
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ciency is considerably less theoretical. It seeks lowest cost
production and efficient allocation of the resources of any particular utility company though promotion of operational efficiency,
both in the long and short run. 6 2 This is crucial to pricing decisions. For example, if lowest cost production is achieved, and resources are efficiently utilized through load management
techniques, rates paid by consumers are reduced.
The validity of production efficiency as a primary objective is
established by several considerations. Such a goal is both practical
and appropriate.
It is an objective that the layman can understand and one that
does not introduce esoteric economic concepts such as optimality. [It] is also consistent with the objective of meeting the revenue requirement. It is therefore a practical and appropriate
objective for electricity pricing and would not interfere with the
63
application of the fairness objective in the rate-setting process.
Several avenues exist that enable commissions to promote production efficiency. The regulatory framework can be altered to
provide greater incentives for the industry to minimize costs. Regulatory lag encourages inflated costs and higher revenue requirements to minimize the inherent penalty involved in long and
protracted rate proceedings. 64 Incentives and penalties could be
implemented, such as, an incentive oriented rate of return and a
streamlined regulatory process, to lessen burdens. 65 In addition,
closer review of utility management decisions through prehearing
management audits and closer evaluation during rate cases prods
the industry to minimize costs.66
62. See R.

63.

SCHMALENSEE,

supra note 2, at 33-34.

ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, supra note 4, at

28.

64. See Warren, The Regulatory Lag Fallacy, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 14, 1980, at 15.
But see Fallaciesin "The Regulatory Lag Fallacy", PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 9, 1980, at 6. See
generally A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 59-63.
65. In the determination of the revenue requirement, special attention should be
given to the rate of return as it relates to efficiency. A higher rate of return for efficient
management would introduce an incentive not currently present in the regulatory process.
Providing a more adequate rate of return, tied to management performance, would go far
towards alleviating the financial crises currently faced by many utility companies. See
Abell, supra note 41, at 31; Lerner, The Efct of the Regulatory Environment on Utilities, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Jan. 7, 1982, at 19, 23; Nolan,Incentive Rate ofReturn, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July
30, 1981, at 50; see also Willis, supra note 41, at 15.
66. See Carrigan, Rxfor Utihties: Management, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 4, 1982, at 15;
Cicchetti & Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 29; Dellon, The Management Audit Pocess: Roomfor
Improvement, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 1, 1979, at 15; Doades, The Mentality of Management
Audits, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 16, 1978, at 25; Frisbee & Akridge, The State of the Utility
ManagementArt: Emerging Utility Strategies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 12, 1981, at 15; Knapp,
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The key here is for the commission to monitor the decision-making processes, not to remake management decisions. A cost minimizing production strategy requires full time work and an inside
knowledge of the industry. Management is in the best position to
make these decisions. The issue is whether the process by which
the decision is made is a rationale one. 67 Finally, the commission

should encourage competition whenever possible. For example,
the generation of electricity appears not to require active regulation of the type needed in a natural monopoly market. Much can
be gained by opening this area to competition. Electrical generation, or any other area which appears to be free from natural monopoly factors justifying regulation, should be explored for
possible introduction of competition.6
Production efficiency should be pursued through mechanical
and procedural adjustments to the regulatory scheme. Management decisionmaking should be scrutinized by the commission
before and during rate cases to assure the best possible management performance. A system of incentives and penalties should be
instituted to provide the industry with incentives to seek lowest
cost production. Finally, the rate case proceeding should not be
excessively adversarial. An effort should be made to increase the
honesty, integrity, and cooperation of the parties. 69 Clearly defined objectives based on concepts of economic efficiency promote
cooperation and effective regulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The utility industry in the United States is undergoing a period
of financial, social, and administrative reexamination. Pressures
facing the industry and government agencies are forcing consideration of different approaches, concepts, and justifications as to the
method by which utilities are regulated. In such an atmosphere, it
Earthquakes and Aftersh."ks The Rgulatory Managment Landscape of the 1980s, PuB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 1, 1981, at 11; Land & Dahlberg, Managingto Achzeve Greater foducivity in the
Utility Indsst7y, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 21, 1981, at 24; Nesbit & Penskar, Making the Most
ofa MandatedManagement Audit, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 17, 1981, at 24; Ray, A New Twist
for the Managment Audit and Bond Ratings, PUB. UTIL FORT., Jan. 17, 1980, at 34; Sargent,

Firhbowl Planningin Management Audits, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 16, 1978, at 22.
67. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 73-74, 100, 113. For example,
has the decisionmaking process adequately considered less costly alternatives to the construction of new generating capacity? Have aggressive conservation and load management measures been fully explored? See Carrigan, sumra note 66, at 15-17.
68. See supra note 46.
69. See Abell, supra note 41, at 32; Willis, supra note 41, at 15.
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is essential that utility commissions determine and give priorities
to objectives.
This article advocates the adoption of economic efficiency as the
principal objective, with fairness in pricing and accountability as
secondary objectives. Adoption of such an approach will aid commissions in effective decisionmaking and allow the public, courts,
and commentators to monitor and evaluate the choices made.
The consumer will ultimately be the primary beneficiary of such a
policy and the industry will be better able to predict future requirements and thus improve its financial position and quality of
service.
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